

FILED EFFECTIVE

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**SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF IDAHO**

**CORRECTION OF FILED RECORD IN THE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO**

The following corrections are submitted for Twin G Holdings, LLC.

1. Melanie Slavens executes this Correction to be filed of record in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Idaho.

2. The records to be corrected are:

2.1 Amendment to Certificate of Organization filed September 5, 2014 as W40557 and is to be corrected in the following particulars: (1) the street and mailing address of the principal office of the Limited Liability Company to be as follows:

Mailing Address and Principal Office:

Twin G Holdings, LLC
353 East 1060 South
Ivins, UT 84738

which address corrects paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Amendment Certificate of September 5, 2014.

Name and Address of the Manager and Member shall be corrected to:

Melanie Slavens
353 East 1060 South
Ivins, UT 84738

and the name of James Adams Slavens is to be omitted.

3. The above changes were a mistake at the time and such mistakes were ultimately adjudicated in the Decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Case No. 43743 filed

CORRECTION OF FILED RECORD - 1

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE
04/10/2017 05:00
CK:999 CT:337664 BH:1578193
10 30.00 = 30.00 STMT CORRE #3

W40557

November 3, 2016. A copy of the Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.

4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice that was filed in Bonneville County District Court in Case No. CV 13-5552-OC on December 15, 2016.

5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Opinion and Order Dismissing the Case and Discharging Glen Townsend as Custodian dated February 8, 2017.

6. The Registered Agent is changed to William A. Parsons, 137 West 13th Street, Burley, ID 83318, and the name of John A. Simmons is removed.

7. The address to which mailings are to be sent is 353 East 1060 South, Ivins, Utah 84738. The former address of 6128 West 8170 South, West Jordan, Utah 84088 is removed.

8. The Application for Reinstatement filed 1/12/2016 is corrected to be Member Melanie Slavens and the date is changed to March 22, 2017. James Adam Slavens is removed.

DATED this 29th day of March 2017.

Melanie Slavens
MELANIE SLAVENS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43743

JAMES ADAM SLAVENS, ALEXA
SLAVENS, and TANNER SLAVENS,
TWIN G HOLDINGS, LLC, and derivatively,
THE ESTATE OF JAMES KENNETH
SLAVENS,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

MELANIE SLAVENS, both personally and
as administrator of THE ESTATE OF
JAMES KENNETH SLAVENS,

Defendants-Appellants.

Pocatello, September 2016 Term

2016 Opinion No. 124

Filed: November 3, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge.

The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Parsons, Smith, Stone, Loveland & Shirley, Burley, for appellants. William A. Parsons and Randy Stone argued.

John Simmons, JD LLM, PC, Idaho Falls, for respondents.

BURDICK, Justice

Melanie Slavens, both personally and as administrator of the Estate of James Kenneth Slavens, brings this appeal from the Bonneville County district court. After the death of James Kenneth Slavens (Jim), James Adam Slavens, Alexa Slavens, Tanner Slavens, Twin G Holdings, LLC, and Jim's Estate (Respondents) sought a declaratory judgment as to the parties' rights in Twin G Holdings, LLC (Twin G), which Jim formed before he died. The district court determined that Melanie had no rights in Twin G and entered judgment that: (1) Jim's three oldest children—James Adam, Alexa, and Tanner (the Eldest Children)—each own 33% of Twin

G; (2) the Eldest Children are Twin G's sole members; (3) James Adam is Twin G's sole manager; and (4) Melanie was never a member or manager of Twin G. We vacate and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2012, Jim was killed in a fatal car wreck. Jim predeceased his wife (Melanie) and five children. Those five children consisted of twins (Gracie and Grant) Jim had with Melanie, and the Eldest Children, who were from Jim's previous marriage.

Seven years before Jim died, he formed the Idaho LLC—Twin G—that is the subject of this appeal. On June 22, 2005, Jim formed Twin G for asset protection purposes. Jim's concerns about asset protection arose after a buyer to whom Jim had sold a business defaulted on debts owed to Jim and other creditors. When those creditors began pursuing Jim, he formed Twin G to shield his assets from a judgment. Twin G was named after Jim and Melanie's twins, Gracie and Grant. Twin G's Articles of Organization list Jim as Twin G's managing member. Twin G's Operating Agreement designates Jim and Johnny Slavens, Jim's brother, as members, with Jim owning 1% and Johnny owning the remaining 99%. Johnny held a largely passive role in Twin G and testified he held the 99% ownership interest in Twin G for Jim's benefit until Jim's death and then for the Eldest Children's benefit.

Jim's relationship with Johnny soured when real property recorded in Johnny's name became involved in a lawsuit in spring 2011. Although Johnny had deeded the property to Jim, Jim never recorded the deed. Therefore, Johnny blamed Jim for the lawsuit. After Jim settled the lawsuit, Johnny told Jim he "need[ed] to absolutely avoid th[o]se types of situations going forward" and expressed hesitation about "allow[ing] someone else to use [Johnny's] name on things for which [he] d[id] not fully understand the details."

Apparently to that end, in April 2011, Jim took efforts to remove Johnny from Twin G. Jim first sent to Johnny an "Addendum" to Twin G on April 21, 2011. If signed, the Addendum purported to transfer Johnny's ownership interest. The Addendum recited that Johnny "desires to have no interest in Twin G" and, therefore, "has agreed to convey his entire interest to James K. Slavens and Melanie Slavens in such a way that they will share an equal interest in the property." When Jim sent the Addendum to Johnny, Jim explained he was unsure whether the Addendum was the proper way to transfer Johnny's ownership interest and requested that Johnny wait to sign it. Johnny never signed the Addendum.

One day later, Jim sent to Johnny an Amended Certificate of Organization for Twin G. Jim, who had already filled in the Amended Certificate, requested Johnny's signature so that Jim "can get [Johnny] out of [Twin G.]" Whereas the Addendum indicated Johnny was merely transferring his ownership interest, the Amended Certificate went further. The Amended Certificate indicated Johnny was "[d]elet[ing]" himself as a member, adding Melanie as a member or manager, and authorizing Jim's ownership of 75% of Twin G and Melanie's ownership of the remaining 25%. Johnny signed and returned the Amended Certificate to Jim in April 2011. However, Jim never filed it with the Idaho Secretary of State. Instead, Jim kept the Amended Certificate in his personal files for approximately nineteen months. Jim could have filed the Amended Certificate when filing Twin G's annual reports in 2011 and 2012, but did not do so. Jim died without filing the Amended Certificate.

After Jim died, Melanie opened a probate proceeding in Utah, where Jim was domiciled, and was appointed special administrator of Jim's estate. Melanie then asserted rights in Twin G and filed the Amended Certificate with the Idaho Secretary of State. Johnny maintained he still had membership and ownership rights in Twin G, despite having executed the Amended Certificate. As Johnny explained, delivery of the Amended Certificate to Jim was conditional on Jim filing it with the Idaho Secretary of State, which Jim never did. Thus, in August 2013, Johnny executed transfer documents purporting to transfer and assign membership, management, and ownership rights in Twin G to the Eldest Children.

In October 2013, Respondents filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights in Twin G. Melanie moved to dismiss, which the district court denied. Respondents then moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court granted. Melanie filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. Thereafter, the district court entered a certified judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Melanie timely appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court properly deny Melanie's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting Johnny's affidavit?
3. Is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's decision to exercise jurisdiction and proceed with an action even though a similar action is pending in another court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Klaue v. Hern*,

133 Idaho 437, 439, 988 P.2d 211, 213 (1999). To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. *Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A.*, 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003). However, “the issue of whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, over which we exercise free review.” *Chapple v. Madison Cnty. Officials*, 132 Idaho 76, 78, 967 P.2d 278, 280 (1998).

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Kozlowski v. Rush*, 121 Idaho 825, 827, 828 P.2d 854, 856 (1992). Thus, we review application of the Deadman’s Statute for abuse of discretion. *Lunders v. Estate of Snyder*, 131 Idaho 689, 699, 963 P.2d 372, 382 (1998).

IV. ANALYSIS

We analyze three primary issues in this appeal. First, we determine whether the district court properly denied Melanie’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Second, we analyze whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting Johnny’s affidavit. Third, we decide whether the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

A. The district court properly denied Melanie’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Our first inquiry is whether the district court properly denied Melanie’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Melanie contends dismissal was required because the Utah probate proceeding was already underway and involved the same issues and the same parties. In contrast, Respondents argue the district court properly exercised jurisdiction because the Utah probate proceeding did not address key issues raised in the Idaho action—membership, management, and ownership of Twin G.

Recognizing the pending Utah probate proceeding involving the same parties, the district court analyzed Melanie’s motion to dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). That rule permits dismissal on the basis of “another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.” I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). “Two tests govern the determination of whether a lawsuit should proceed where a similar lawsuit is pending in another court.” *Klaue*, 133 Idaho at 440, 988 P.2d at 214. The first test applies when “the other case has gone to judgment, in which event the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion may bar additional litigation.” *Id.* The district

court properly recognized the first test does not apply because the Utah probate proceeding had not gone to judgment.

The second test applies when a district court, “although not barred from deciding the case, should nevertheless refrain from deciding it.” *Id.* Three primary considerations guide whether dismissal is proper:

In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case when there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, a trial court must evaluate [1] the identity of the real parties in interest and the degree to which the claims or issues are similar. The trial court is to consider [2] whether the court in which the matter already is pending is *in a position to determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights of the parties*. Additionally, the court may take into account [3] the occasionally competing objectives of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to litigants, obtaining prompt and orderly disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments.

Id. (quoting *Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford*, 124 Idaho 20, 22–23, 855 P.2d 481, 483–84 (Ct. App. 1993)).

Here, the district court properly concluded Rule 12(b)(8) did not require dismissal. After first perceiving the issue as discretionary, the district court acted consistently with relevant legal standards articulated in *Klaue*. The district court acknowledged how the Utah probate proceeding and the Idaho action involved the same parties, but not the same issues. Whereas the Utah probate proceeding served to administer Jim’s estate, the Idaho action served to determine the composition of Twin G. Those issues are too dissimilar to constitute the “same cause” under Rule 12(b)(8). As the district court succinctly recognized, Respondents’ “claim for membership in Twin G . . . is not at issue in the Utah probate proceeding.” The district court further recognized that dismissing the Idaho action would have required Respondents to file a separate action or seek a petition for allowance in the Utah probate proceeding. But, since petitions for allowance are discretionary, “there [was] no guarantee that the Utah court would hear [Respondents’] claims.” Thus, to save “time, expense, and delay . . . and to ensure [Respondents’] case is heard,” the district court denied Melanie’s motion to dismiss.

On appeal, Melanie takes issue with how the district court evaluated her motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(8). Melanie contends the district court should have evaluated her motion to dismiss as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). According to Melanie, the district court had no discretion to exercise

jurisdiction because the Utah probate proceeding had exclusive jurisdiction and, thus, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.

We reject Melanie's argument for two reasons. First, Melanie's arguments against jurisdiction, explored above, center on the Utah probate proceeding being "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause." See I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). Melanie's arguments therefore triggered the district court's discretion under Rule 12(b)(8). Second, article V, section 20 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity" Melanie points to no authority establishing that the Utah probate proceeding had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the parties' rights in *Twin G*. Melanie cites to a flurry of Idaho and Utah statutes, but she fails to cogently explain how those statutes establish the Utah probate proceeding's exclusive jurisdiction. Melanie overlooks that the district court fully explained why the Utah probate proceeding did not have exclusive jurisdiction, even if it had concurrent jurisdiction. To that end, the district court cited *Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford*, 124 Idaho 20, 22, 855 P.2d 481, 483 (Ct. App. 1993) for the principle that:

Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject, and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its action.

Thus, as the district court acknowledged, when the other court has not yet exercised jurisdiction, dismissal is improper even though the other court may exercise jurisdiction over the issue. *Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd.*, 129 Idaho 532, 534, 927 P.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1996). Since the Utah probate proceeding never exercised jurisdiction over the parties' rights in *Twin G*, the district court properly concluded the Utah probate proceeding did not have exclusive jurisdiction. We affirm that the district court properly denied Melanie's motion to dismiss.

B. The district court abused its discretion by admitting Johnny's affidavit.

Next, we analyze whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting Johnny's affidavit. Melanie argues Johnny's affidavit is inadmissible under the "Deadman's Statute," Idaho Code section 9-202(3), because it contains testimony of alleged oral agreements Johnny had with Jim. Specifically, Johnny testified: (1) he, at Jim's request, agreed to hold a 99%

ownership interest in Twin G for the benefit of Jim and the Eldest Children; and (2) he delivered the Amended Certificate to Jim on the condition that only Jim could file it.

The Deadman's Statute makes the following witnesses incompetent to testify:

Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator, upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the death of such deceased person.

I.C. § 9-202(3); *see also* I.R.E. 601(b).¹

We have observed that the Deadman's Statute only "bars (1) certain persons from testifying (2) in specified actions (3) as to certain communications." *Argyle v. Slemaker*, 99 Idaho 544, 547, 585 P.2d 954, 957 (1978). All three requirements are clearly met in this case because: (1) by purporting to transfer and assign rights in Twin G to the Eldest Children, Johnny is an "assignor[] of parties" to the action; (2) the Eldest Children have made a claim against Jim's estate; and (3) Johnny's testimony concerns a communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before Jim's death. Thus, the literal elements of the Deadman's Statute indicate Johnny's affidavit is inadmissible.

Nevertheless, the district court held that Johnny's affidavit was admissible under two exceptions to the Deadman's Statute. The first exception applies when written evidence substantiates the oral testimony. We have stated that "[w]hen testimony of an alleged oral agreement is presented alone, it is inadmissible; however, 'written evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement' is admissible." *Montgomery v. Montgomery*, 147 Idaho 1, 8, 205 P.3d 650, 657 (2009) (quoting *In re Estate of Keeven*, 110 Idaho 452, 460, 716 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1986)). For example, in *In re Estate of Keeven*, 110 Idaho at 459–60, 716 P.2d at 1231–32, we addressed whether the Deadman's Statute barred testimony as to the decedent's unwritten intentions. The appellant contended his wife had intended to convey to him an interest in real property, but died before doing so. *Id.* We noted that the appellant had "produced no written evidence whatsoever to establish his claim" *Id.* at 460, 716 P.2d at 1232. We emphasized that "what [the appellant] claims he and his wife intended to do in the future cannot rise to the level of written evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement" *Id.* Thus, we held that the Deadman's

¹ The only difference between Idaho Code section 9-202(3) and Idaho Rule of Evidence 601(b) is "I.C. § 9-202(3) has a comma after the phrase 'estate of a deceased person,' whereas that comma is omitted in I.R.E. 601(b)." *Montgomery v. Montgomery*, 147 Idaho 1, 8 n.1, 205 P.3d 650, 657 n.1 (2009).

Statute barred the testimony because “[w]hat [the appellant] is relying upon here is an oral agreement, pure and simple.” *Id.*

The second exception applies when the oral testimony merely concerns “a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before the decedent’s death.” *Argyle*, 99 Idaho at 547, 585 P.2d at 957. At issue in *Argyle* was whether the Deadman’s Statute barred testimony concerning the physical condition of a deed at the time of delivery. *Id.* at 546–47, 585 P.2d at 956–57. With that testimony, the appellants aimed to have the deed declared void by showing the deed lacked a description of the property at the time of delivery. *Id.* We held that the Deadman’s Statute did not bar the testimony, explaining that testimony as to the deed’s physical condition at the time of delivery concerned “a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before the decedent’s death.” *Id.* at 547, 585 P.2d at 957.

In this case, the district court erred by determining that the above exceptions were satisfied. First, written evidence does not substantiate Johnny’s testimony. The district court concluded emails between Johnny and Jim substantiate Johnny’s testimony. Yet, the record does not support that conclusion. As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court did not isolate any specific emails that allegedly substantiate Johnny’s testimony. Similarly, Respondents have not cited to any specific emails, but instead broadly assert that the emails as a whole are “replete as written corroboration and substantiation of the dialogue as Johnny explains it in his testimony.” Our review of the emails forces us to disagree. The emails do not indicate Johnny and Jim ever agreed that Johnny would hold the 99% ownership interest in Twin G for the benefit of Jim and the Eldest Children. Nor do the emails show Johnny delivered the Amended Certificate to Jim on the condition that only Jim could file it. The most salient email shows Jim asked Johnny to sign the Amended Certificate “and send it, so [Jim] can get [Johnny] out of [Twin G.]” But that single email, standing alone, is too tenuous to substantiate Johnny’s testimony. Therefore, as in *Keeven*, we conclude Johnny’s testimony is based on oral communications, “pure and simple.”

Moreover, Johnny’s testimony exceeds the exception for testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact. The district court concluded, without analysis, that Johnny’s testimony “declares matters of fact as to what took place at the time the agreement was made and describes the state of Jim’s affairs as they related to [Twin G].” However, even a cursory review of Johnny’s affidavit unveils testimony as to alleged oral agreements with Jim. Unlike the

testimony concerning the deed's physical condition in *Argyle*, Johnny repeatedly testified he engaged in conduct either because Jim had requested it or because of alleged oral agreements with Jim. Thus, Johnny's testimony exceeds the exception for testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact.

In sum, the district court's application of the Deadman's Statute constitutes an abuse of discretion. Because Johnny's affidavit is the only evidence supporting the judgment in Respondents' favor, we vacate the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As guidance for the district court on remand, we note that, absent Johnny's affidavit, the record before us illustrates Johnny dissociated as a member of Twin G at the moment he communicated his agreement to sign the Amended Certificate. Quite clearly, Johnny manifested notice of his "express will to withdraw as a member" under Idaho Code section 30-6-602(1) by communicating his agreement to sign the Amended Certificate, which recited he was "[d]elet[ing]" himself as a member.

C. We decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

Both parties seek attorney fees on appeal. They argue each other has acted frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. This Court has explained it will only award attorney fees "if the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." *Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen*, 156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d 1072, 1081 (2014) (citation omitted). "Fees will generally not be awarded for arguments that are based on a good faith legal argument." *Easterling v. Kendall*, 159 Idaho 902, 918, 367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016). Because both parties made good faith legal arguments, we decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION

Because we conclude the Deadman's Statute bars Johnny's affidavit, we vacate the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to Melanie.

Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON, **CONCUR.**

DISTRICT COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO
16 DEC 21 PM 3:30

PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, LOVELAND & SHIRLEY, LLP
LAWYERS
BURLEY, IDAHO

William A. Parsons
R.C. Stone
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, LOVELAND
& SHIRLEY, LLP
137 West 13th Street
P. O. Box 910
Burley, Idaho 83318
Attorneys for Defendant
Telephone Number (208) 878-8382
Fax Number (208) 878-0146
Idaho State Bar #849
Idaho State Bar #1890
(SlavensMelanie\SlavensMotiontoDismiss.doc)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

James Adam Slavens, Alexa Slavens and) Case No. CV 13-5552-OC
Tanner Slavens, Twin G. Holdings, LLC, and)
derivatively, the Estate of James Kenneth)
Slavens,)
Petitioners,)
v.) MOTION TO DISMISS
Melanie Slavens, both personally and as) WITH PREJUDICE
administrator of the Estate of James Kenneth)
Slavens,)
Respondent.)

The Defendants move to dismiss the Captioned Case with Prejudice on the grounds and for the reasons that as stated in the decision of the Supreme Court of November 3, 2016 and the Remitter dated November 28, 2016 and as filed by the Court the Court held that the Judgment was vacated and that the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Supreme Court Decision Page 9. In the case of Remitter as filed with the Clerk the Supreme Court said "It is Hereby Ordered that the District Court shall forthwith comply the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required."

The only item remaining for decision is the discharge of Mr. Townsend as custodian of certain funds and after that is disposed of the case should be dismissed or done simultaneously that he is directed to turn over the money and that the case be dismissed.

The Supreme Court is very clear in its decision on page 9 when it says:

"In sum, the district court's application of the Deadman's Statute constitutes an abuse of discretion. Because Johnny's affidavit is the only evidence supporting the judgment in Respondents favor we vacate the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As guidance for the district court on remand, we note that, absent Johnny's affidavit, the record before us illustrates Johnny disassociated as a member of Twin G at the moment he communicated his agreement to sign the Amended Certificate." Quite clearly, Johnny manifested notice of his "express will to withdraw as a member" under Idaho Code section 30-6-602(1) by communicating his agreement to sign the Amended Certificate, which recited he was "[delet[ing]] himself as a member. (emphasis supplied).

DATED this 15 day of December, 2016.

PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, LOVELAND
& SHIRLEY, LLP



William A. Parsons
Attorneys for Respondent
137 West 13th Street
Box 910
Burley, ID 83318

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 15 day of December, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing upon the following:

John Simmons
796 Memorial Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

by depositing a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to the above named persons at the above addresses, their last known addresses.

PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, LOVELAND
& SHIRLEY, LLP



William A. Parsons
Attorneys for Respondent
Box 910
Burley, ID 83318

2017 FEB -8 AM 11:45
DISTRICT COURT
7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

JAMES ADAM SLAVENS, etal.,

Petitioners,

v.

MELANIE SLAVENS, etal.,

Respondent.

Case No. CV-2013-5552

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING
THE CASE AND DISCHARGING GLEN
TOWNSEND AS CUSTODIAN

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates the facts as previously laid out in its prior decisions in this case. On November 28, 2016 this case was remanded to the district court with instructions to comply with the Idaho Supreme Court's directives.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On a motion to dismiss, the court looks only at the pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. The question then is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." *Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm'n*, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455, 459 (2005).

III. ANALYSIS

The Idaho Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court determining: "Because Johnny's affidavit *is the only evidence supporting the judgment in Respondents favor* we vacate the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion" (emphasis added). Thus while Petitioner's brief argues that other exceptions to the Deadman's Statute may to Johnny's affidavit and that there are still interests to be determined, the Idaho Supreme Court was clear that Johnny's affidavit was the *only evidence* supporting judgment in Respondents' favor. As that affidavit has been determined inadmissible, this action must be dismissed.

The Supreme Court further instructed this court to "comply the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required." After review, the only action remaining in this case is the discharge Mr. Townsend as the custodian of funds.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. Respondent's motion to discharge Glen Townsend as custodian is granted.
2. Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 2 day of February 2017.


Jon J. Shindurling
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of February, 2017, the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER was entered and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Attorney for Petitioners

John Simmons
JOHN SIMMONS JD LLM PROF. CO.
796 Memorial Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Attorney for Respondent

William A. Parsons
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE,
LOVELAND & SHIRLEY, LLP
137 West 13th Street
P.O. Box 910
Burley, ID 83318

Custodian

Glenn Townsend
Nelson & Townsend
485 E. St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Penny Manning
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

by A. B. Baines
Deputy Clerk

2017 FEB -8 AM 11:45
DISTRICT COURT
7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY ID

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

JAMES ADAM SLAVENS, etal.,

Petitioners,

v.

MELANIE SLAVENS, etal.,

Respondent.


Case No. CV-2013-5552

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: the above captioned case is hereby
dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 2 day of February 2017.


Jon J. Shindurling
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of February, 2017, the foregoing JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL was entered and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Attorney for Petitioners

John Simmons
JOHN SIMMONS JD LLM PROF. CO.
796 Memorial Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Attorney for Respondent

William A. Parsons
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE,
LOVELAND & SHIRLEY, LLP
137 West 13th Street
P.O. Box 910
Burley, ID 83318

Penny Manning
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

by

A. Baer
Deputy Clerk